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Abstract
Background: On June 11, 2009, the World Health Organization declared phase 6 of the novel influenza A/H1N1 pandemic.
Although by the end of September 2009, the novel virus had been reported from all continents, the impact in most
countries of the northern hemisphere has been limited. The return of the virus in a second wave would encounter
populations that are still nonimmune and not vaccinated yet. We modelled the effect of control strategies to reduce the
spread with the goal to defer the epidemic wave in a country where it is detected in a very early stage.
Methodology/Principal Findings: We constructed a deterministic SEIR model using the age distribution and size of the
population of Germany based on the observed number of imported cases and the early findings for the epidemiologic
characteristics described by Fraser (Science, 2009). We propose a two-step control strategy with an initial effort to trace,
quarantine, and selectively give prophylactic treatment to contacts of the first 100 to 500 cases. In the second step, the
same measures are focused on the households of the next 5,000 to 10,000 cases. As a result, the peak of the epidemic could
be delayed up to 7.6 weeks if up to 30% of cases are detected. However, the cumulative attack rates would not change.
Necessary doses of antivirals would be less than the number of treatment courses for 0.1% of the population. In a sensitivity
analysis, both case detection rate and the variation of R0 have major effects on the resulting delay.
Conclusions/Significance: Control strategies that reduce the spread of the disease during the early phase of a pandemic
wave may lead to a substantial delay of the epidemic. Since prophylactic treatment is only offered to the contacts of the first
10,000 cases, the amount of antivirals needed is still very limited.
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Introduction
On June 11, 2009, the World Health Organization (WHO)
declared Pandemic Phase 6 based on sustained community
transmission in more than one WHO region [1]. By the end of
September 2009, in most European countries the impact has been
limited, which is likely due to the dampening effect of the summer
months. What the futureholds is difficult to predict as pastpandemics
have been rather variable because of the complex interactions of
immunity, pathogenicity, season and other factors [2]. Many
countries have established a stockpile of antivirals for the treatment
of the (severely) sick. We examine how a control strategy in the very
beginning could defer the peak of the epidemic by using only a very
small part of the stored antivirals for prophylactic treatment.
There are a number of possible public health measures that may
be used to stop or slow down the spread. Border control has been
extensively discussed in this context to delay the international
spread of influenza. However, in order to achieve a significant
delay, more than 99% of air travel would have to be stopped [3].
As has been shown for SARS, entry screening methods are
unlikely to detect more than 10% of imported infections and the
positive predictive value of temperature screening is low especially
at the beginning of a pandemic [4,5]. It is therefore inevitable that
importation occurs. For the management of imported cases, other
measures may be used and include contact tracing, isolation and
quarantine, as well as post exposure prophylaxis. It is unclear;
however, which public health strategy could be effective in
preventing the spill-over from imported cases and slow-down the
transmission within the general population. Even less clear is how
long these measures should be maintained, particularly once that
domestic transmission has started.
Mathematical models can be used to aid in decision making and
have been increasingly applied to analyse the potential impact of
containment strategies, pharmaceutical interventions and public
health measures on the course of a novel influenza pandemic [6–9].
Before the emergence of the novel influenza A/H1N1, virus
modelling studies have suffered from the high number and
uncertainty of necessary assumptions [10]. Even during the first
months of the pandemic with the novel virus A/H1N1 only limited
knowledge has emerged about the characteristics of the new virus
[11,12]. Therefore, we do not stress the particular timing and
severity of a certain baseline scenario, but rather concentrate on the
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estimation of the possible effects of these interventions.
To construct possible baseline scenarios we used some of the
estimates of properties of the novel virus that have been published
based on data from the initial outbreak in Mexico by Fraser [11].
Similar estimates for R0 and a little higher estimates for the
generation time were found in the USA [13]. We constructed a
deterministic model with the following goals:
(1) To model a possible evolution of an epidemic in Germany
including assumptions about importation and domestic spread
using the present knowledge about the virus;
(2) to quantify the potential impact of public health measures,
such as case detection, case isolation, quarantine of contacts,
and the use of antiviral medication for therapy and post
exposure prophylaxis, with a given effectiveness, on the initial
evolution of the epidemic;
(3) to identify possible conditions, which – if known – favour the
adaptation of measures or the termination of the control
strategies.
Results
Number of Imported Cases
Until June 5th, the rate of imported cases has been stable in
Germany. The first identified cases in Germany were confirmed on
April 29
th, and until June 5
th a total number of 49 confirmed cases
had been reported (Figure S1(A)). Of these 41 (84%) had a known
travel history to Mexico, the United Kingdom or the USA; of the
remaining 8 cases 7 had been contacts to one of the imported cases
and for one case the source case was unknown but might have been
related to contacts with travellers (airport worker). The average
number of imported cases during this time period (38 days)
corresponds to 1.1 cases per day, however, 28 of the 41 imported
cases were reported during the 10 days prior to June 5
th
(corresponding to 2.8 imported cases per day). We considered two
different scenarios of case importation (Figure S1(B)): firstly, a
constant number of imported cases per day (five or ten cases per day),
and secondly, an exponentially growing number of imported cases
limited to 120 imported cases per day. The exponential growth rate
was determined by assuming an ‘‘import-R0’’ of 1.1 and the same
generation time as for the transmission inside Germany.
Model of Possible Evolution of an Epidemic in Germany
An example for the prevalence of symptomatic cases resulting
from our SEIR model is shown in Figure S2 for three different
values of R0 (1.34, 1.58, and 2.04). For an R0 of 1.58 the point
estimate of the timing of the peak after introduction of the first
case would be 10 to 11 weeks (depending on the number of
imported cases, compare Table 1), the point estimate for the peak
prevalence of the population infected would be 4.3%, for the total
attack rate of the population infected 44.8% and for the
population diseased 38.5% (Table 1). Depending on the three
R0 the cumulative proportions of children that develop symptoms
are 48%, 67%, and 79%, and the cumulative proportion of
symptomatic adults 17%, 34%, and 54%, respectively. As a result
of the higher susceptibility of children in the model the peak
proportion of infected children is reached 18, 12 or 8 weeks (126,
82, or 56 days) after the first infected case, roughly 1-1.5 weeks
earlier (i.e. 11, 8 or 6 days) than in adults (data not shown).
Model of the Impact of Public Health Measures
Figure S3 shows how the peak is delayed for an assumed R0 of
1.58 and 5 imported cases per day when the first 500 cases are
managed with a combination of intensive case-based measures
(CCM1), followed by 10,000 with management mainly restricted to
members of the household (CCM2; for details see Methods section).
The effect of the number of household focused interventions
(CCM2) on the delay of the peak is dependant on the basic
reproduction number R0 and the sensitivity of the surveillance
system (FigureS4). When R0 is at least1.58 and not more than 30%
of cases can be detected, saturation occurs relatively early. Even if
50%ofthe casescanbedetected orR0isassmallas1.34 the peakof
the epidemic can not be deferred any more after management of
approximately 10,000 cases with CCM2. In general can be said: the
higherR0theearliermanagement with CCM2 becomes ineffective.
This can only be balanced to a certain degree by a higher sensitivity
of the surveillance system.
The following considerations are done on the basis of 5
imported cases per day and R0 equal to 1.58.
Effect of sensitivity of the surveillance system. The delay
of the peak increases with the proportion of detected cases. When
10% of cases are detected and these are followed-up with CCM1
for the initial 500 cases (but no CCM2) the delay is 6 days, but can
be raised to 20 days (gain of 2 weeks) when case detection is
improved to 30%. The combined approach of 500 cases targeted
with CCM1 and additional 10,000 cases with CCM2 the gain
based on the improved case detection results in an increase for up
to 6 weeks (11 to 50 days; Figure S3, Table 2).
Separate analysis of the effect of CCM1 and CCM2. In
the example above 55% (6 of 11 days; 10% case detection rate) or
40% (20 of 50 days; 30% case detection rate) of the delay,
respectively, is already achieved through CCM1 alone (Table 2).
Table 1. Characteristics of the baseline scenario without preventive interventions under the assumption that each day 5 cases
were imported to Germany.
R0
peak time
(in weeks)
attack rate
(in %)
peak prevalence
(in %)
duration above 1%
(in weeks)
duration above 0.1%
(in weeks)
1.34 total infected 14.9 27.1 1.7 4.4 12
symptomatic 14.9 23.3 1.5 3.7 11.6
1.58 total infected 10.3 44.8 4.3 5.2 9.6
symptomatic 10.3 38.5 3.7 4.8 9.3
2.04 total infected 7 67.6 10.2 4.3 6.9
symptomatic 7 58.1 8.8 4.1 6.7
The other importation scenarios (10 cases per day, exponentially growing number per day) lead to very similar characteristics.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0008356.t001
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number imported cases – of course under the assumption that
already in the beginning the surveillance system detects a
percentage of the imported cases.
Effect of R0. All of the above calculations are very sensitive to
the value of R0. If R0 is as low as 1.34 it is much easier to delay
the peak. If it is high, such as 2.0 or more, and the number of
imported cases is at least 5 per day, then the effect of CCM1 and
CCM2 can delay the peak at most by 8 weeks (57 days; Table 2),
but only when case detection rate is high (50%).
Estimation of the Resources Needed
The personnel and personnel time that is needed to implement
such measures depends on the number of local health departments
involved, their capacity and many other factors. The maximum
number of antivirals, however, can be estimated. Assuming that
each case has 15 contacts that merit attention for CCM1 and
would get antiviral post exposure prophylaxis, this would result in
a maximum of 500615 (=7,500) treatment courses (as the
number of doses for treatment equals the number of doses for
prophylaxis). Further, if the household members of 10,000 cases
are given antiviral prophylaxis this would amount to another
10,00063 (=30,000) treatment courses, in total 37,500 treatment
courses.
Discussion
We present here a model how public health measures can
contribute to the delay of an epidemic wave with the novel
influenza virus A/H1N1 when the epidemic is detected in a very
early stage. Delaying the pandemic spread is an important
achievement because it gains time for other measures and
preparations, such as early assessment of the virus’ characteristics,
activation of surge capacities or vaccine production and the
development of a vaccination strategy [10].
The transmission parameters of our model were derived from
the initial analysis of the epidemic in Mexico by Fraser [11] and a
constant or slowly increasing influx of imported cases as observed
for one month after the identification of the first case in Germany.
This is also in agreement with European data showing a constant
proportion of travel-related cases over time (the travel related cases
within Europe between April 16 and June 2 also seem to remain
constant over time [14]).
It has been shown before that so called targeted layered
containment strategies, a combination of antiviral prophylaxis and
non-pharmaceutical interventions, can be effective in reducing the
transmission of pandemic influenza [8]. We extended this
approach by analyzing the effect of a more intensive phase
including contact tracing, identification and management of
contacts outside of the household (CCM1), followed by household
centred measures (CCM2).
The assumed effectiveness for CCM1 indicates that a
corresponding strategy would be very effective in reducing the
spread of the epidemic, if R0 is moderate or low and if the number
of imported cases does not increase rapidly. In contrast, the
household centred measures (CCM2) continue to gain time, even
when larger amounts of cases are imported per day. In the model,
the effect of CCM1 and CCM2 rapidly decreased for higher
Table 2. Delay (in days) of the peak of the epidemic wave for adults in Germany as a function of the number of imported cases
(column A), the number of CCM1 and CCM2 treatments, R0 and the case detection rate (10%, 30% or 50%).
CCM2 for following
0 cases 5,000 cases 10,000 cases
A CCM1 Ro Case detection rate Case detection rate Case detection rate
10% 30% 50% 10% 30% 50% 10% 30% 50%
5 imported cases/day for first 100 1.34 7 15 19 21 164 .180 24 .180 .180
1.58 4 10 16 10 42 .180 11 49 .180
2.04 3 7 11 5 17 48 5 18 56
for first 500 1.34 12 40 74 22 172 .180 24 .180 .180
1.58 6 20 47 10 43 .180 11 50 .180
2.04 3 10 22 5 17 49 5 18 57
10 imported cases/day for first 100 1.34 5 9 11 18 109 .180 21 163 .180
1.58 3 7 10 9 35 180 10 42 .180
2.04 1 4 7 4 14 39 4 16 47
for first 500 1.34 9 26 40 18 114 .180 21 167 .180
1.58 5 15 28 9 36 194 10 42 .180
2.04 2 8 15 4 14 40 4 16 47
increasing number of
cases/day (R0=1.1)
for first 100 1.34 9 18 23 22 72 94 25 89 126
1.58 5 15 23 11 45 90 12 51 111
2.04 3 9 17 5 19 53 5 21 61
for first 500 1.34 13 34 42 22 74 97 25 90 129
1.58 7 25 44 11 46 92 12 52 113
2.04 3 12 29 5 19 54 5 21 61
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0008356.t002
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when the delay becomes only marginal. To our knowledge, the
question of conditions that would lead to stopping interventions (or
the lowered effects of specific measures) has so far been studied
only in the context of community mitigation strategies and
interventions, such as school closures [15].
Modelling studies analyzing preventive measures often assume
that the intervention will be available for a large part or the whole
population [6,8,16]. E.g. Carrat et al. analysed the effect of
combined interventions targeting up to 70% of households in their
‘‘small-world-like’’ model [17]. In contrast, our model focuses on
the initial stage and the first few thousand cases in Germany, and
on the delay that can be achieved. We have restricted the analysis
of maintaining the less intensive CCM2 strategy for 10,000
courses. The maximum amount of antivirals used in this approach
corresponds to treatment courses for less than 0.1% of the German
population and 5% of the amount available for seasonal influenza
in the winter season. After the end of isolation, the treated contacts
were assumed to remain susceptible to the infection. However,
these conservative assumptions result only in a shift (depending on
R0 significant) of the epidemic curve and virtually no reduction of
the overall attack rate.
As we have shown, a number of factors are important when
effects of public health interventions are considered. First, the rate
of seeding has significant impact on the delay that can be achieved
by the interventions. Other published models start their simulation
with one infection, a random number each day or an increasing
number at a reduced R0. In contrast, our analysis is based on the
observed number of cases. Second, the sensitivity of the
surveillance system to detect cases is important. In reality,
detection of cases without travel history to countries with
community transmission of novel influenza A/H1N1, i.e. domestic
cases, may be difficult as the clinical picture of the disease has
proven to be often non-specific. Therefore, sensitivity to detect
cases may be relatively low. Given these limitations we have
provided a number of different scenarios (case detection rates of
10, 30 and 50%) addressing how the described interventions may
impact the epidemic.
As a note of caution it must be mentioned that these calculations
should of course not be mistaken as a prediction. It was for
example not possible to validate the assumptions about the
effectiveness of the interventions using real data.
Other limitations are: (1) While before the start of the novel A/
H1N1 epidemic it was difficult to make realistic assumptions, it is
now easier to do so now, since first estimates can be drawn for a
number of parameters of the novel influenza virus. Nevertheless,
many pieces of information are uncertain and may change due to
more information coming to light, or due to real changes of the
virus and its epidemiology. (2) The effect of season is not taken into
account, we expect that the virus is more easily transmitted in the
fall or winter time [18,19]. (3) The proportion of asymptomatic
cases and their contribution to transmission is still unknown. (4)
Lacking realistic alternative information we distinguished only two
age groups, children and adults. (5) The evolution of the number
of cases imported is unknown and will probably change over time.
(6) The age dependence of susceptibility in Germany is unknown
and is likely to differ from the one in Mexico. (7) The sensitivity of
surveillance is unknown, and therefore the true proportion of cases
detected is also unknown. If persons were infected in Germany
from a source without travel history, then they may have been
more easily missed, especially since initial surveillance efforts
usually focus on diseased persons with travel history. (8) The rigor
of public health measures is likely to vary among different local
health departments. However, it is plausible that the measures
taken contributed to the delay of the initial spread of the infection,
because, until mid June at latest, virtually no tertiary cases had
been detected by close surveillance of contacts and the
surrounding of cases.
In the model the change from CCM1 to CCM2 was suggested on
a population level. In reality, of course, there might not be a real
threshold and the strategy might change depending on the individual
resources of local health authorities. Of course with the change of the
epidemiologic picture more rigorous measures of social distancing,
such as school closures may be implemented. When leaving the
intensive phase of contact tracing and case management (CCM1), we
believe that CCM2, or a strategy with similar effect, might be well
suited to follow after because it focuses on the household. This is a
much more amenable unit and is based on the knowledge that being
a member of a household with a confirmed case is the highest single
risk factor for influenza infection [6].
In conclusion, despite the many possible pitfalls and caveats of our
study we believe that we have demonstrated the possible impact of a
sequential strategy on the spread of the novel influenza virus A/
H1N1 in a country where imported cases start the epidemic.
Materials and Methods
Number of Imported Cases
Cased-based information was used to assign reported confirmed
cases in Germany and status of either imported or domestic. Cases
with travel history of more than 7 days before onset of symptoms
(two times the maximal incubation period) were considered
domestic.
The Model
(a) Assumptions. We assumed that at the outset of the epidemic
the entire population is fully susceptible to infection with the
influenza A/H1N1 virus. Infectiousness was assumed to be equal in
symptomatic and asymptomatic persons. This is based on the
rationale that a lower degree of infectiousness is coupled with
unrestricted mobility resulting in a higher number of potentially
infectious contacts. In comparison, a higher degree of infectiousness
in symptomatic patients is compensated by the reduction of the
number of contacts, because patients are isolated and bedbound.
Assuming that the epidemiologic and virologic characteristics
are similar to the epidemic in Mexico allowed us to use the values
as described by Fraser [11]. They found the ‘‘most likely’’ basic
reproductive number was 1.58, range 1.34 to 2.04, and estimated
a generation time of 1.91 days (95% confidence interval 1.3–2.71).
They distinguished children (,15 years of age) and adults (.=15
years of age) and found that children were 2.06 (95% confidence
interval 1.60–3.31) as susceptible as adults. The assortativity of
mixing between children and adults was estimated as 0.5 (95%
confidence interval 0.00–0.72) - an assortativity of 0 corresponds
to a completely random mixing, whereas 1 corresponds to fully
assortative groups. Finally, they found that 86% (95% confidence
interval 69%–100%) of the infected persons become symptomatic.
We considered three different scenarios of R0, namely R0 equal to
1.34, 1.58 or 2.04 and used the point estimates for all other
parameters. The model does not incorporate assumptions about
the severity of disease or how severity might alter infectiousness.
Estimation of the Impact of Public Health Measures
Lastly we needed to make assumptions about the effectiveness of
the public health measures and the sensitivity of the surveillance
system. Assumptions are made for the effectiveness of two
approaches that combined several case-based public health
measures (combination of case-based measures; CCM):
Modelling Interventions
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contact tracing, quarantine and post-exposure prophylaxis of
selected contacts in- and outside of the household (CCM1).
Because CCM1 consumes many resources it is assumed that
CCM1 will only be sustained in the first phase. We model two
scenarios with the first 100 or up to 500 cases cared for by
CCM1 countrywide.
(2) Less- intensive measures, focusing on the household, including
isolation and therapy of cases, quarantine and post-exposure
prophylaxis of household contacts (CCM2). Thus, we assume
that following the initial 100–500 confirmed index cases there
will be no contact tracing any more, i.e. no more post
exposure prophylaxis for non-household contacts.
CCM1 and CCM2 are set to be 75% and 50% effective in
reducing secondary cases, respectively. We modelled four
scenarios: in the first and second, CCM1 is maintained for the
first 100 cases followed by 5,000 or 10,000 cases cared for with a
CCM2 strategy, in the third and forth, CCM1 is maintained for
500 cases followed by 5,000 and 10,000 cases with a CCM2
strategy, respectively.
To include the effect of surveillance we made assumptions about
the number of imported cases that are recognized. For this
purpose we varied the proportion of recognized imported cases
from 0%, 10% and 30% to 50%. The assumed sensitivity of the
surveillance system reflects the probability (10%, 30% or 50%) to
detect domestic cases. A higher probability to detect imported
cases would have led effectively to a reduced total number of
imported cases per day in the model.
(b) Construction. We used – similar to Fraser [11] in their
description of the outbreak in La Gloria – a generalised age-
stratified deterministic SEIR model to describe the spread of the
disease [20,21].
Weused thefollowingassumptionsabouttheage distributionand
size of the population of Germany: 71,000,000 adult population
(.=15 years of age), 11,000,000 children (,15 years of age).
The complete model is described in the Appendix S1.
Supporting Information
Figure S1 Confirmed imported (red) and domestic (blue) cases
in Germany by date of onset of symptoms (A). The symptoms of
the first confirmed case could be fixed for April 21. For three cases
(one imported and two domestic cases), the date of onset of
symptoms remained unknown; these cases have been assigned
their reporting date (hatched boxes). (B) shows the three different
modelled scenarios of importations.
Found at: doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0008356.s001 (5.31 MB TIF)
Figure S2 Modelled evolution of the number of total (A) and age-
stratified cases (B) with novel A/H1N1virus in Germany. Parameters
valuesaretakenfromFraser(Science,2007),anditisassumedthatno
preventive public health measures are taken. Prevalence of infectious
cases is modeled for three values of Ro (1.31, 1.58, and 2.04) with the
additional assumption that each day five cases were imported to
Germany. The prevalence is calculated as proportion of infectious
persons among the total population in the respective age group.
Found at: doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0008356.s002 (4.72 MB TIF)
Figure S3 Delay of epidemic curve. The ‘‘most likely’’ Ro of
1.58 from the study of Fraser et al. (Science, 2007) was used and
case detection rates of symptomatic cases were set to 10% and
30%, respectively. Ro is assumed to be 1.58, and each day five
cases were imported. The household and non-household contacts
of the first 500 detected cases were treated with a combination of
case-based measures that include contact tracing, quarantine, and
post-exposure prophylaxis (CCM1); and the household contacts of
the next 10,000 cases were managed with strategy CCM2, which
includes only preventive measures in the household of the cases.
Found at: doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0008356.s003 (2.28 MB TIF)
Figure S4 Delay of the peak of the epidemic depending on the
number of CCM2 treatments. The respective curves start where
CCM1 has taken effect already in the first 500 detected cases. (A
and B): The delay in days is presented for case detection rates of
10%, 30%, and 50%. R0 is set to 1.58. (A) shows the delay when 5
cases are imported per day, and (B) shows when an exponentially
increasing number of cases, but not more than 120, are imported
per day. (C and D): The delay in days is presented for basic
reproduction numbers of 1.34, 1.58, and 2.04. The case detection
rate is set to 30%. (C) shows the delay when 5 cases are imported
per day, and (D) shows when an exponentially increasing number
of cases, but not more than 120, are imported per day.
Found at: doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0008356.s004 (7.72 MB TIF)
Appendix S1 Description of the SEIR model.
Found at: doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0008356.s005 (0.01 MB
TEX)
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